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INTRODUCTION
There have been various claims about the economic impact of the New
Zealand Employment Contracts Act, 1991 (ECA). For instance, in Free to
Work: The Liberalisation of New Zealand's Labour Market, Australian
economist Wolfgang Kasper claims that the resulting industrial relations
had economic benefits.' He concludes, "[tihe Employment Contracts Act
has substantially enhanced the productivity of labor and capital, output, and
employment growth because it has been an essential ingredient in the transformation of New Zealand's institutional order to greater flexibility and
competitiveness."'
However, as this review will show, despite using Kasper's statistical
criteria, the empirical evidence does not support his conclusions. There appears to have been little economic benefit, if any, from the ECA, other than
perhaps for employers at the expense of workers. In particular, there is no
evidence of significant productivity gains, an issue that is explored in this
Paper. International comparisons support the likelihood that the ECA did
not have an economic benefit. 3
GDP GROWTH
Kasper claims that the ECA has enhanced economic growth: "The projection is for the economy to keep growing for the remainder of the decade
* Economic And Social Trust On New Zealand. I am grateful to Professor Bryan Philpott and to Professor Ellen Dannin for numerous discussions.
1. Wolfgang Kasper, Free to Work: The Liberalisationof New Zealand's Labour Market, 32 POLICY MONOGRAPH 51 (Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney, 1996).

2. Id.
3. Kasper also offers numerous opinions unsubstantiated by any evidence. For example,
he contends that "[t]he New Zealand workforce has reacted constructively to the market signals." Id. at 43-44. These are not pursued here, except to note that if the available facts contradict Kasper's account, it seems unlikely that his unresearched opinions have any greater

validity.
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at a trend growth rate of around 4 percent., 4 Figure I repeats the first graph
of Kasper's economic evaluation, but includes more recent (and revised) official data, including projecting the volume GDP figures through to March
1999, using the June 1997 N.Z. Institute of Economic Research (NZIER)
consensus forecasts, which average the predictions of fourteen forecasters.'
In addition, a "trend" growth rate of 3 percent per annum is shown.
The story is clear enough. The New Zealand economy had been stagnated from 1990 (in fact earlier) through to the end of 1992. From late 1992,
the economy began a rapid (and widely hailed) expansion. However, this
expansion did not last long enough to catch up to the 3 percent trend line.
After ten quarters, the growth petered out, expanding at about 1.5 percent in
the year through March 1997. Further out, the NZIER expected growth to
hover around 3 percent a year, in contrast to Kasper's claim of a sustainable
4 percent p.a. GDP growth rate.
REAL WAGES

Kasper used a different presentation for his second graph of real wages
changes, his presentation having the effect of obscuring the minuscule real
(income) wage growth over the period. As this Paper's Figure 2 shows,6 the
increase amounted to a total of about 2 percent over seven years.7 Part of the
gains are probably due to labor force composition effect. Thus, there was an
increase as the economy contracted, resulting in lower paid workers being
laid off, and a fall during the early part of the upswing. Kasper's own estimate is a .4 percent annual average growth of real wages. In summary,
within the margin of error, and allowing for composition effects, real wages
hardly increased over the period.
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH

As the third of Kasper's graphs shows, employment numbers rose
sharply from mid-1993, as one might expect in a cyclical upswing. Initially,
firms expanded output by increasing the intensity of labor usage within the
firm. As underutilized labor became exhausted, firms expanded extensively
by hiring more workers.
However, Kasper seems quite oblivious of the implications of high employment growth with modest output growth. As Figure 3 shows, the pro-

4. Id. at 16.
5. See Figure 1, Appendix. NEW ZEALAND INSTITUFE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH,
CONSENSUS FORECASTS (July 1997).

6. See Figure 2, Appendix.
7. Kasper does not define his variables although there are a number of possibilities. The
numerator of Figure 2 is Average Hourly Earnings (ordinary time); the denominator is the
Consumer Price Index.
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ductivity growth record for the New Zealand economy has been poor.8 In the
seven years since 1990, there was a total gain of about 5 percent. The forecasters do not expect any major increases in the immediate future. It is also
evident that the big gains came during the period of the early upswing, when
firms used their existing labor force more intensively. It could be argued
that the ECA enabled new work methods with the ending of restrictive
practices that generated one-time increases in productivity. Distinguishing
these gains from those that might result from a cyclical upswing is not easy,
and has not been attempted. However, that the main gains coincide with the
early part of the cyclical upswing rather than the years immediately after the
introduction of the ECA suggests that the cyclical recovery had the stronger
impact. But even if there were gains from the ECA, they were one-time, and
not ongoing ones.
One might contrast the events portrayed here with the story which Kasper tells about the Australian economy. It has not been possible to check his
statistics, but an examination of his data shows almost the same output
growth over the period from 1990 to 1995, except that the Australian upswing was later and faster than the one in New Zealand. However, Australia experienced much less employment growth, by about 1 percent a year.
Thus, Australian productivity growth outperformed New Zealand productivity growth by the same 1 percent a year.
Kasper not only ignores such data but insists there has been substantial
productivity growth: "We can conclude that the Employment Contracts Act
has substantially enhanced the productivity of labour.. ." The data, had he
presented it, would have belied such a claim, or at best shown only small
one-time increases. Indeed, if Kasper is to believed, the productivity gains
are even less. He says, "[s]ome knowledgeable observers believe that employment statistics under-report employment growth since the ECA."' 2 He
does not, however, say who these people are.
THE PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLE
Bryan Philpott's detailed work has provided a productivity series for
the New Zealand economy back to 1977/8." Three sectors-importables,
exportables, and non-tradeables-are graphed in Figure 4.4 It is extremely
hard to discern any significant change in the trend of any of the three series,

8. See Figure 3, Appendix.
9. Kasper, supra note 1, at 50-51.

10. Id. at 51.
11. Id. at49.
12. Bryan Philpott, A Note on Recent Trends in Labour Productivity Growth, Research
Project on Planning Paper 281 (Oct. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The
labor force unit is employment, adjusted for part-time working.
13. See Figure 4, Appendix.
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once allowance is made for cyclical effects and measurement problems."
Despite the economic reforms of the last decade, there is no perceptible impact of the reforms on the long-run trend of overall productivity. This conclusion holds true for the post-ECA era, but also for the post-1984 era.
Philpott shows that there were significant productivity gains in a set of
sectors-mining, forestry, electricity, and communications-whose largely
government-owned (in 1984) firms were corporatized and privatized. These
sectors experienced a substantial increase in their productivity growth following these reforms, presumably as a result of the ensuing labor layoffs.
This boost seems to have stopped after 1992/3. However, because the restructured sectors contributed only 10.3 percent to GDP in 1977/8 (rising to
15.7 percent in 1995/6), their substantial productivity gains did not impact
greatly on overall economic performance.
UNEMPLOYMENT

As Figure 5 shows,' 6 there has been a substantial fall in the New Zealand unemployment rate since its peak in 1991 of 11 percent. 7 The fall is
not surprising, given the sharp rise in employment. Forecasters expect that
the unemployment rate will hover above 6 percent throughout the late
1990s." In assessing the unemployment rate, it should be noted that it was
probably below 4 percent in 1984 when the reforms began. As recently as
1988, the unemployment rate was below 6 percent, so that Kasper's graph
does not show the rise which was occurring before 1990. The graph gives
the impression that the fall was to levels that had not been previously attained.
THE MALONEY STUDY

Kasper quotes research by Auckland University economist, Tim Maloney, claiming that the ECA increased employment." A detailed econometric review of Maloney's study concluded that the econometric evidence is
14. The non-tradeable sector has higher labor productivity levels than the tradeable sectors because it includes the capital intensive energy, communications, and home ownership
sectors.
15. See Figure 5, Appendix.
16. Kasper's data seem to be seasonally adjusted. (They have since been revised.) Indicative of his grasp of New Zealand data, Kasper graphs "white" male unemployment rates.
Kasper, supra note 1, at 45, Fig. 2. "White" is not used in this context in New Zealand, and
rarely in others, because of its racist connotations. New Zealand data is by self-categorized
ethnicity, in which case Kasper is probably referring to the European/Pakeha rate.
17. See, e.g., supra note 5.
18. The particular data series does not begin until 1986.
19. Tim Maloney, Estimating the Effects of the Employment Contracts Act on Employment and Wages in New Zealand, 20(4) AUSTL. BULL. LAB. 320-43 (Dec. 1994); UNIVERSrrY
OF AUCKLAND ECONOMIC DEPARTMENT, HAS NEW ZEALAND'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT

INCREASED EMPLOYMENT AND REDUCED WAGES? (June 1996).
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flawed because some of the coefficients of the reduced form equations are
theoretically wrong, implying that the remainder may be biased; many of
the coefficients of the underlying structural form equations of labor supply
and demand are theoretically wrong in magnitude and/or sign; the unionization data series is problematic, because it derives from two sources, with the
juncture at exactly the point of the introduction of the ECA; and because the
interpolation of the unionization data gives a spurious level of accuracy.'
Thus, Maloney's Paper provides little scientific evidence that the Employment Contracts Act has impacted the level of employment. Maloney,
himself, is aware of many of these problems. Indeed, he does not even reach
the conclusion that Kasper suggests he does. Rather, after recognizing some
of the weaknesses in his econometric conclusions, he writes, "suppose we
accept that the ECA... has resulted in increases in employment?"'" If the
researcher has to suppose a proposition, then it cannot be claimed that he
has demonstrated it, as Kasper asserts.
THE ECONOMY AND THE ECA

The data show that the post-ECA economy was in a stagnation phase
until late 1992. It then began to expand rapidly, initially by using the internal resources of firms which had not been fully employed during the stagnation, but later by employing more labor. Productivity gains were not high,
and those that occurred were of the magnitude and timing to be expected in
a normal cyclical recovery of that strength. It would appear that this extensive rapid growth phase was over by the end of 1995. The forecasters' consensus is that the New Zealand economy has now settled down to a modest
long-term growth rate of just under 3 percent p.a., based primarily on increased use of labor and capital, with no substantial increase in productivity
growth. '
Kasper is keen to credit this not very impressive expansion to the effects of the ECA. He concludes, "[i]t would be hard not to attribute most of
this enhancement to the improved institutional framework surrounding labour markets." 3 Indeed, Kasper could have been more explicit by saying
that it was "easy" to explain the enhancement by attributing it to the ECA.
But easy explanations are rarely correct ones and often not supported by the
evidence, as in this case.
A richer account of the New Zealand growth experience of the mid1990s is that there was a bounce back from the contraction/stagnation phase
of the late 1980s and early 1990s, fueled by a favorable fall in the real ex20. B.H. Easton, Flawed Evidence, Bad Work 57-63 (Centre for Research on Work and
Society, York University, Working Paper 16, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
21. Maloney, supra note 19.
22. See, e.g., supra note 5.
23. Kasper, supra note 1, at 45.
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change rate (which has since been reversed); a substantial improvement in
the terms of trade (which were about 10 percent higher in the early 1990s
compared to what they were in the late 1980s); and the upswing of the
world economy, especially when the Australia expansion absorbed New
Zealand manufacturing exports. The New Zealand expansion was based on
additional applications of labor and capital, rather than improved productivity performance. When the available capital and appropriately skilled labor
ran out, economic growth slowed down.
Which of these two accounts is to believed? The poor productivity performance discriminates between them. If the Employment Contracts Act
had worked in the way its proponents claim, there should have been substantial and ongoing productivity gains. Such gains have not occurred.
ENTHUSIASM FOR THE

ECA

Despite the lack of evidence of significant improvements in economic
performance from the ECA, there remains considerable enthusiasm for the
legislation in the business community. Undoubtedly, some arises as a result
of the change in the industrial relations balance in managerial-employee relations.
A survey of managers reports "increased productivity and operational
flexibility and greater training. 2 4 However, no statistical evidence exists for
substantial gains in productivity above the trend of previous years following
the introduction of the ECA. This apparently misconceived enthusiasm may
be explained by (1) managers attributing normal productivity gains to the
ECA; (2) managers having greater freedom to manage than in the past, because they are less constrained by law and by unions, thereby assuming that
these benefits to themselves must result in improved benefits to the firm in
greater productivity; and (3) management confusing productivity with labor
costs.
As Figure 6 shows, labor costs have been restrained.25 The real
(income) wage (of Figure 3) divided by the labor productivity index (of
Figure 2) gives a measure of the degree to which productivity gains had
been shared with workers.26 The overall pattern is that the index fell about
four percent in the mid-1990s, suggesting that workers' wages have not
shared in the (albeit small) productivity gains over the period. It would not
be unreasonable to attribute reduction in worker share of prosperity to the
Employment Contracts Act. But while reductions in costs to a firm from
lower remuneration rates may be of great importance to a firm, they are not
24.

NEw ZEALAND INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, QUARTERLY SURVEY OF BUSINESS

OPINION (Mar. 1996).
25. See Figure 6, Appendix.
26. Real income wages were used here because they were illustrated in Figure 2. Thus,
the measure indicates that workers have not benefited from the productivity gains in their
take-home pay.
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the same thing as improvements in productivity.
I too have been astonished by the ECA's failure to have a perceptible
impact on productivity since it was implemented. I have reexamined the
numbers and adjusted the definitions in various ways. What I had assumed-what everyone had assumed-was that work practices workers had
been able to impose in the old industrial relations system had reduced output. There are anecdotes to support this, and the generalization seemed safe.
It seemed likely that managers would use the greater power the ECA gave
them to eliminate such inefficient work practices, thus generating higher
productivity. Again, anecdotes to that effect abound. But if there were such
eliminations, they were apparently insufficient to accelerate overall productivity. Perhaps at best they generated a small one-time gain. Perhaps
worker-controlled work practices did not affect the growth of productivity,
which is not so surprising. Workers have an interest in higher productivity,
because it enables them to extract higher pay. Perhaps there were only few
or marginal occasions when they restricted efficiency in a way that reduced
their pay, or the measures had short-term impacts on work effort, but sustained high levels in the long run. Insofar as any of these effects were significant, the primary gains to employers from the ECA have been lower pay
and greater freedom to manage, not higher output per worker.
THE INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

The conclusion that the ECA has not contributed greatly to economic
performance, except perhaps making the inflation goal easier to attain by
increasing managers' ability to restrain labor costs, is not inconsi stent with
some of the international evidence on labor market flexibility. It is often
claimed that the U.S. labor market is more flexible than Western Europe's,
resulting in higher U.S. employment growth. But it is equally true that the
U.S. economy experiences poorer productivity growth, as Table 1 shows.'
So a flexible labor market need not have a good labor productivity performance, a conclusion consistent with the New Zealand experience.
At this stage, two tentative hypotheses are worth investigating. It is
possible that there is no necessary connection between so-called labor market flexibility and productivity gains at all. Alternatively, it is possible that a
negative relationship exists between this labor market flexibility and productivity performance.
Although economists write of "flexibility," this term is extremely difficult to define or measure. As a result, discussion tends to be anecdotal,
something which the rest of this section cannot entirely avoid. The Concise
Oxford Dictionary defines "flexible" as "that which will bend without
breaking, pliable, pliant, easily led, manageable: adaptable, versatile; sup-

27. See Table 1, Appendix.
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pie, complaisant."' Economists probably have in mind the first group of
meanings, specifically the ability of an economy to adjust to a shock without generating unemployment in the labor market, and equivalent disruptions in other markets. But some economic inflexibility may not be a bad
thing. If one's home were to be totally flexible, it would fall down around
one's ears. Similarly, firms consciously build inflexibility into their operations. Physical and human investment activities in a modern economy involve the transformation of resources with many possible uses into ones
with much more dedicated uses, a transformation which results in loss of
flexibility.
Labor market flexibility is not an easy notion to capture. The OECD defines the following five types of flexibility:
(1) External numericalflexibility: the number of employees is adjusted to
needs; (2) Externalisation:part of the firm's work is put out to enterprises
or individuals who are not bound by the contract of employment; (3) Internal numericalflexibility: the number of working hours is adjusted in

line with needs, but the number of workers remains unchanged; (4) Functional flexibility: workers' job assignments are modified according to
needs; (5) Wage flexibility: labour costs, and thus wages, are adjusted.

To simplify, we need to distinguish between short-term flexibility, such
as that the ECA promotes, and long-term flexibility, which is about how a
labor force increases its skills and ability to carry out a multitude of tasks. It
is possible that long-term flexibility is undermined by short-term flexibility,
which inhibits the worker from developing a loyalty to the firm, and the acquisition of firm specific skills, while also discouraging the firm from developing those skills in its work force. Insofar as this trade-off exists, the
ECA (and, more generally, discussion on labor market flexibility which focuses on short-term flexibility) could undermine the development of longterm productivity. Advocates of the efficacy of the ECA may prefer to argue
that the ECA has not affected productivity negatively, but the evidence
bears out the conclusion that augmented productivity growth has not occurred.
In terms of the two possibilities, a recent OECD report has taken the
cautious line that no correlation appears to exist between labor market flexibility and labor market performance.' However, the second possibility must
be left open. Excessive short-term flexibility may damage labor market outcomes.

28. CoNcisE OXFORD DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1982).

29. OECD, LABOUR MARKETFLEXIBIITY: TRENDs INENTERPRISES 13 (1989).
30. OECD, EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK (July 1997).
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SUMMARY

Many advocates of economic reforms have tended to hypothesize certain benefits and then assume that these benefits have been necessarily realized after the reforms were implemented. They then selectively use anecdotes and statistics to buttress the case. Systematic empirical investigation,
as presented here, often suggests otherwise. This pattern has been true
among advocates of the ECA. On the basis of the empirical evidence and
systematic analysis, it is very difficult to reach strong conclusions about the
beneficial economic effects of the Employment Contracts Act. In particular,
the poor productivity growth rules out the likelihood that the ECA was a
major contributor to the macroeconomic expansion of the mid-1990s. However, the Act does seem to have contributed to the poor real wage growth
and the failure of many workers to obtain a share in any increase in the
prosperity of the 1990s.
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Figure 3
PRODUCTIVITY
(March 1990 = 100)
110

107

104

101

98

95

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

MARCH QUARTER

Figure 4
The Productivity Puzzle
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